The Enduring Neighborhood Effect,
Everyday Urban Mobility,
and Violence in Chicago
Robert J. Sampson† and Brian L. Levy††
A longstanding tradition of research linking neighborhood disadvantage to
higher rates of violence is based on the characteristics of where people reside. This
Essay argues that we need to look beyond residential neighborhoods to consider
flows of movement throughout the wider metropolis. Our basic premise is that a
neighborhood’s well-being depends not only on its own socioeconomic conditions
but also on the conditions of neighborhoods that its residents visit and are visited
by—connections that form through networks of everyday urban mobility. Based on
the analysis of large-scale urban-mobility data, we find that while residents of
both advantaged and disadvantaged neighborhoods in Chicago travel far and
wide, their relative isolation by race and class persists. Among large U.S. cities,
Chicago’s level of racially segregated mobility is the second highest. Consistent
with our major premise, we further show that mobility-based socioeconomic disadvantage predicts rates of violence in Chicago’s neighborhoods beyond their residence-based disadvantage and other neighborhood characteristics, including during recent years that witnessed surges in violence and other broad social changes.
Racial disparities in mobility-based disadvantage are pronounced—more so than
residential neighborhood disadvantage. We discuss implications of these findings
for theories of neighborhood effects on crime and criminal justice contact, collective
efficacy, and racial inequality.

Chicago is used to making the national news for violence.
Whether for the rat-a-tat days of Al Capone’s gangster era in the
1920s, the extreme violence of the late 1980s and early 1990s
captured so poignantly in Alex Kotlowitz’s There Are No Children
Here, or the police killing of Laquan McDonald in 2014—which
prompted widespread protests—Chicago has played an outsize
role in the American tale of violence. 1 Some of this selective
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1
See generally ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE NO CHILDREN HERE (1992). In one of
the most well-known incidents of violence in that era, seven-year-old Dantrell Davis was
shot to death one morning while walking to school with his mother in the Cabrini-Green
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attention is misguided. Chicago is not the nation’s murder capital, as many have erroneously claimed. 2 Although by no means a
model of peace, Chicago has consistently scored below other U.S.
cities like Detroit, Cleveland, Memphis, and New Orleans in per
capita murder rates. 3
Crime and violent victimization have also fallen in Chicago,
as they have elsewhere, in the last quarter century. Black men
benefitted the most in the form of increases in life expectancy, 4
and children of all races coming of age in Chicago in recent years
were much less likely to be arrested than kids growing up in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. 5 Moreover, while police brutality in
Chicago is legendary 6—and the reach of incarceration is orders
of magnitude higher in the city’s predominantly Black neighborhoods than in its White neighborhoods 7—racial disparities in
criminal justice are national in scope, and incarceration rates
began to decline around 2010 (especially for Black Americans). 8
The reputation of Chicago as a uniquely violent city is thus misleading, and things have improved, including for minorities, on
many counts.
housing project. Murdered by a gang member who had been aiming to take out a rival,
Dantrell’s death made national news and became an unwanted symbol of the state of
public housing in Chicago. See BEN AUSTEN, HIGH RISERS: CABRINI-GREEN AND THE FATE
OF AMERICAN PUBLIC HOUSING 195–99, 204–05 (2019); see also People v. Garrett, 658
N.E.2d 1216, 1218–20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
2
President Donald Trump famously singled out Chicago’s violence on several
occasions, but he is far from alone in prioritizing rhetoric over factual analysis. See Aziz
Z. Huq & John Rappaport, Symposium Introduction: This Violent City? Urban Violence
in Chicago and Beyond, 89 U. CHI. L. REV. 303, 303 (2022) (concluding that “the
empirical data about Chicago’s crime and policing trends belie the most dramatic of
these claims”).
3
Elisha Fieldstadt, Murder Map: Deadliest U.S. Cities, CBS NEWS (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://perma.cc/X7NN-VCZC; Cities with Most Murders 2021, WORLD POPULATION REV.,
https://perma.cc/5RWS-AGNR.
4
Patrick Sharkey & Michael Friedson, The Impact of the Homicide Decline on Life
Expectancy of African American Males, 56 DEMOGRAPHY 645, 646 (2019).
5
Roland Neil & Robert J. Sampson, The Birth Lottery of History: Arrest over the
Life Course of Multiple Cohorts Coming of Age, 1995–2018, 126 AM. J. SOCIO. 1127, 1169
(2021) (“The probability of being arrested is nearly twice as large during the peak ages of
delinquency in adolescence for cohorts born in the early to mid-1980s compared to
younger cohorts born in the mid-1990s.”).
6
See Jon Burge and Chicago’s Legacy of Police Torture, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://perma.cc/85DK-MLFE.
7
Robert J. Sampson & Charles Loeffler, Punishment’s Place: The Local
Concentration of Mass Incarceration, DÆDALUS, Summer 2010, at 20, 26–27.
8
See Christopher Muller & Alexander F. Roehrkasse, Racial and Class Inequality
in U.S. Incarceration in the Early Twenty-First Century, SOC. FORCES (forthcoming
2022); John Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate Falls to Lowest Level Since 1995,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/ES5P-DUR9.
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The city’s legacy of punishment and violence is nonetheless
deeply troubling and continues apace even as violence has declined considerably from its late-twentieth-century high. In the
spring of 2021, for example, the shootings of young children
again made national news. On a Sunday afternoon in April,
Jaslyn Adams, age seven, was shot to death in her father’s car
while waiting in a McDonald’s drive-thru in Chicago’s North
Lawndale neighborhood. 9 A few weeks earlier and less than a
mile and a half south, in the city’s Little Village neighborhood,
thirteen-year-old Adam Toledo was shot to death in an alley by a
police officer called to investigate gunshots. 10 While the city’s
rate of murder is lower than it was in the early 1990s, 2020 also
witnessed a decisive surge in killings, up 50% from the previous
year. 11 One of the victims was one-year-old Sincere Gaston, who
was shot to death riding in his mother’s car in the Englewood
neighborhood on a particularly violent Saturday in June—the
same day that a ten-year-old girl was killed sitting at home
when a stray bullet ripped through her window. 12
No one knows if violence will continue or plummet, but the
continuing loss of young lives like Jaslyn, Adam, and Sincere
demands rigorous scrutiny, not rhetoric. In this Essay, we focus
our analytic attention on three central facts exposed by these
tragic examples: First, whether at the hands of fellow residents
or the state, violent victimization is highly uneven in its spatial
distribution. Some neighborhoods are relatively immune while
others suffer compounded forms of violence on a regular basis.
Second, spatial inequality is far from random. Neighborhoods
9
Christian Farr, Activists, Family Outraged by Fatal Shooting of Girl, 7, in
McDonald’s Drive-Thru, NBC CHI. (Apr. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/5U36-3J7P.
10 Neil Vigdor, What to Know About the Police Shooting of Adam Toledo, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/8L9M-FKG6.
11 Don Babwin, Chicago Ends 2020 with 769 Homicides as Gun Violence Surges,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/4QDE-BNQR.
12 Jessica Villagomez & William Lee, After 3 Children Shot, 2 Fatally, Chicago
Violence Continues Sunday Morning with 3 More Homicides, CHI. TRIB. (June 28, 2020),
https://perma.cc/9NNW-MCZQ; Rosemary Sobol, Jeremy Gorner & Alice Yin, ‘When Is
This Going to Stop,’ Says Chicago Police Chief After Baby Boy Shot with Mom in
TRIB.
(June
27,
2020),
Englewood
Dies,
CHI.
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-child-shot-20200627
-azxdl66q3farlf2g5syd3f4zea-story.html. In the same neighborhood of Englewood, four
more people were murdered three days later. Paige Fry, Jeremy Gorner & Katherine
Rosenberg-Douglas, Young Mother Killed in Englewood Mass Shooting That Left 4 Dead,
4 Injured: ‘She Was Supposed to Graduate Today’, CHI. TRIB. (June 14, 2021),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-chicago-mass-shooting-englewood
-20210615-pw2fpkxatzan5hyii5qbsefwhu-story.html.
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with the highest rates of violence, incarceration, and police killings are characterized by racial segregation and the correlated
adversities of concentrated poverty. Poor Black neighborhoods in
particular experience disproportionately high rates of homicide,
exerting both short-term and long-term negative effects on the
well-being of their residents. 13 Third, even during an era of social
change and marked fluctuations in violence, neighborhoods tend
to maintain their positions of privilege and disadvantage. The
Near North Side of Chicago maintains its relative safety advantage, for example, while neighborhoods like Englewood on
the South Side and North Lawndale on the West Side continue
to stand out in their disproportionate exposure to multiple forms
of violence and criminal justice contact. Paradoxically, then,
neighborhoods are always changing, but they are remarkably
persistent in their relative positions of compounded disadvantage.
Taken together, these facts constitute what has been called
the enduring neighborhood effect on violence and well-being. 14 In
Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood
Effect, Professor Robert Sampson examined a range of neighborhood effects across multiple units of geography, outcomes, and
time scales with a major focus on violence. 15 In this view,
neighborhood effects command a broad scope, from individual
perceptions to the higher-order social structure of the city. This
Essay extends neighborhood-effects theory in the latter direction,
pushing beyond the traditional boundaries of a neighborhood to
consider flows of movement throughout Chicago and other large
U.S. cities. A basic premise is that a neighborhood’s well-being
depends not only on its own socioeconomic conditions but also on
the conditions of the neighborhoods that its residents visit and

13 For an in-depth look at the profound effects of exposure to neighborhood violence,
see generally PATRICK T. SHARKEY, UNEASY PEACE: THE GREAT CRIME DECLINE, THE
REVIVAL OF CITY LIFE, AND THE NEXT WAR ON VIOLENCE (2018). Not only is violence a
leading cause of racial differences in life expectancy, but there is also recent evidence
that racial disparities in violent victimization in Chicago have increased after years of
steady decline; this increase is explained by the rise of violence in Chicago in the late
2010s and 2020. See Patrick T. Sharkey & Alisabeth Marsteller, Neighborhood
Inequality and Violence in Chicago, 1965–2020, 89 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 370 (2022)
(demonstrating that “[t]he overall increase in murders between 2014 and 2020 has
disproportionately affected Black residents” and that, “[i]n 2020, the murder rate in the
average Black resident’s neighborhood rose to its highest point in the fifty-six-year period”).
14 See ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 362–63 (2012).
15 Id. at 22–24, 407–09.

2022]

The Enduring Neighborhood Effect

327

are visited by—connections that form through networks of everyday urban mobility. The importance of mobility for a neighborhood’s vitality and ability to regulate crime has a rich intellectual
history; from Jane Jacobs’s notions about “eyes [on] the street” 16
to routine-activities theory’s conceptualization of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and capable guardians, 17 scholars have
long thought that the flow of people in a place matters.
Based on this framework, we highlight three sets of empirical results from research on networks of movement throughout
the fifty largest U.S. cities, with a focus on how Chicago fares
relative to other cities. The first result is that even though residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods may travel far and wide,
their relative isolation by race and class persists. So too does the
isolation of the affluent. Second, a city’s degree of social connectedness depends on how uneven and concentrated the networks
of everyday mobility are among its neighborhoods, which in turn
predicts rates of violence across cities. Notably, Chicago’s level of
racially segregated mobility is one of the highest in the country.
Third, building on ideas about connection or isolation among a
city’s neighborhoods, we find that socioeconomic disadvantage
in a neighborhood’s mobility network helps explain its rates of
violence beyond residential disadvantage. This includes the
prediction of violence in Chicago neighborhoods in the last decade, which has seen spikes in murder rates. Our results offer a
new way of thinking about enduring neighborhood effects on
violence, contact with institutions of criminal legal processing,
collective efficacy and prospects for criminal justice reform, and
racial inequality.
I. NEIGHBORHOOD AND BEYOND
Inspired in large part by the classic Chicago tradition of
urban sociology, the study of variations in crime rates across
neighborhoods and cities has a long history. One of the mainstays
of inquiry is how the socioeconomic conditions of neighborhoods
and cities predict crime rates. Concentrated poverty and racial
isolation, especially when concurrent, are strong predictors—
and arguably causes—of violence. 18 But neighborhoods do not
JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 35–38 (1961).
Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson, Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A
Routine Activity Approach, 44 AM. SOCIO. REV. 588, 589 (1979).
18 See Matthew R. Lee, Concentrated Poverty, Race, and Homicide, 41 SOCIO. Q.
189, 202 (2000); Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Racial Segregation and Black Urban
16
17
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exist in social or physical isolation, in large part because of
strong patterns of residential spatial segregation in the United
States. 19 The result is that neighborhoods are often surrounded
by other neighborhoods that are socioeconomically similar. 20
These extralocal but proximate spatial processes matter—the
socioeconomic conditions of nearby neighborhoods are important
predictors of violence in a given neighborhood. 21
Although spatial interdependence has been well studied and
methods have been adapted to deal with its presence, a “higherorder” network perspective looks at the connections among
neighborhoods originating from individual mobility across the
metropolis. Cross-neighborhood ties are distinct from both internal neighborhood processes and spatial processes induced by
proximity to adjacent or nearby neighborhoods. 22 In Great
American City, this theoretical view was advanced by examining
how individual-level actions created network structures in Chicago
through interneighborhood residential mobility and citywide ties
among organizational leaders. 23 The idea was that moving from
one neighborhood to another creates a tie, as does one leader
consulting with another leader in a different community to address a problem, even a problem that is local in nature. 24 A city
can be further defined by the extent to which its neighborhoods
are structurally tied together through the many connections that
these actions forge. In this way, the individual, neighborhood,
and city levels are united analytically through neighborhood
networks. 25
Homicide, 71 SOC. FORCES 1001, 1020 (1993); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID 15, 150–52 (1993).
19 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 18, at 74–77 (describing “hypersegregation” of
urban African Americans as characterized—in part—by residential “clustering” of
multiple adjacent Black communities).
20 Id.
21 See RUTH D. PETERSON & LAUREN J. KRIVO, DIVERGENT SOCIAL WORLDS:
NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME AND THE RACIAL-SPATIAL DIVIDE 102–04 (2010).
22 See Corina Graif, Alina Lungeanu & Alyssa M. Yetter, Neighborhood Isolation in
Chicago: Violent Crime Effects on Structural Isolation and Homophily in Interneighborhood Commuting Networks, 51 SOC. NETWORKS 40, 40–41 (2017) (examining the
impact of violence on interneighborhood connectivity networks); Andrew V. Papachristos
& Sara Bastomski, Connected in Crime: The Enduring Effect of Neighborhood Networks
on the Spatial Patterning of Violence, 124 AM. J. SOCIO. 517, 519–20 (2018) (examining
violence diffusion and how cross-neighborhood ties are created by the movement of criminally engaged individuals).
23 SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 311–13, 329–31.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 309–10; Papachristos & Bastomski, supra note 22, at 519–20.
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We can expand this idea further by thinking about everyday
mobility. People shop, visit friends, go to school, commute to
work, and go out to eat in many different places. There is an
emerging body of research taking an “everyday-mobility-based”
perspective on urban inequality that shows how neighborhoods
matter well beyond the boundaries of where one lives. 26 A study
based on travel accounts from a sample of about three thousand
Los Angeles residents found that “social isolation is experienced
by residents of both highly disadvantaged and highly advantaged neighborhoods because the two groups spend time in
largely nonoverlapping parts of the city”; moreover, racial segregation exacerbates these patterns of social isolation. 27 In this
paper, we analyze large-scale social-media data and cell phone
records to estimate the everyday movement of residents
throughout Chicago. Before addressing implications for crime and
violence, the focus of this Essay, it is important to first understand patterns of individual urban mobility and neighborhood
isolation. 28
II. URBAN MOBILITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD ISOLATION BY RACE
AND CLASS
Living in disadvantaged neighborhoods is widely assumed
to undermine life chances because residents are isolated from
middle-class or “mainstream” neighborhoods with greater resources, job possibilities, and other opportunities.29 Many theories
of crime thus hypothesize that concentrated poverty and social
isolation lead to higher crime rates. 30 Yet people do not just live

26 Robert J. Sampson & Brian L. Levy, Beyond Residential Segregation:
Mobility‑Based Connectedness and Rates of Violence in Large Cities, 12 RACE & SOC.
PROBS. 77, 77–78 (2020) (reviewing the state of research on the link between violence,
disadvantage, and “mobility-based connectedness”).
27 Lauren J. Krivo, Heather M. Washington, Ruth D. Peterson, Christopher R.
Browning, Catherine A. Calder & Mei-Po Kwan, Social Isolation of Disadvantage and
Advantage: The Reproduction of Inequality in Urban Space, 92 SOC. FORCES 141, 141 (2013).
28 We sketch an overview of major findings and refer readers to the original research papers that we draw on for further details, including the measurement of key
concepts, analytic methods, and detailed results. For an independent review on urban
mobility and crime that is comprehensive in nature, see generally Christopher R.
Browning, Nicolo P. Pinchak & Catherine A. Calder, Human Mobility and Crime:
Theoretical Approaches and Novel Data Collection Strategies, 4 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY
99 (2021).
29 Cf. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 7–8 (1987).
30 Lee, supra note 18, at 202.
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in their neighborhoods. Common experience and research from
travel diaries verify that over the course of a typical day or
week, people often leave their neighborhoods of residence and
travel throughout the city. 31 Despite this fact, research that tests
the role of concentrated poverty and social isolation from this
“extralocal,” or neighborhood-networks, perspective is relatively
sparse. 32
To provide a revised conceptualization and test of neighborhood isolation that improves on static measures from census data
on home neighborhoods and small-sample studies based on time
diaries, Qi Wang, Nolan Phillips, Mario Small, and Robert
Sampson leveraged fine-grained dynamic data on the everyday
movement of residents from over 650 million geocoded tweets. 33
They used machine-learning techniques on these large-scale data
to estimate the home locations of almost four hundred thousand
residents of the fifty largest U.S. cities; in turn, they estimated
their travel to neighborhoods throughout a city’s entire commuting zone over the course of eighteen months. 34 This strategy expands the argument from Great American City by directly estimating interneighborhood contact based on everyday travel
patterns rather than residential moves to new neighborhoods,
which are much rarer. 35
A key finding by Wang and colleagues was the “surprisingly
high consistency” in patterns of travel from residents of neighborhoods of different race and income characteristics in terms of
their average travel distance and number of unique neighbor31 See Christopher R. Browning, Catherine A. Calder, Brian Soller, Aubrey L.
Jackson & Jonathan Dirlam, Ecological Networks and Neighborhood Social Organization, 122 AM. J. SOCIO. 1939, 1942–44 (2017); Christopher R. Browning & Brian Soller,
Moving Beyond Neighborhood: Activity Spaces and Ecological Networks as Contexts for
Youth Development, 16 CITYSCAPE 165, 169–70 (2014).
32 For some of the limited work on this subject, see generally Brian L. Levy, Nolan
E. Phillips & Robert J. Sampson, Triple Disadvantage: Neighborhood Networks of Everyday
Urban Mobility and Violence in U.S. Cities, 85 AM. SOCIO. REV. 925 (2020) (exploring the
relationship between traditional correlates of neighborhood disadvantage and patterns of
interneighborhood movement); Qi Wang, Nolan Edward Phillips, Mario L. Small & Robert
J. Sampson, Urban Mobility and Neighborhood Isolation in America’s 50 Largest Cities,
115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 7735 (2018) (evaluating social isolation and segregation in
light of complex interneighborhood movement patterns); and Nolan E. Phillips, Brian L.
Levy, Robert J. Sampson, Mario L. Small & Ryan Q. Wang, The Social Integration of
American Cities: Network Measures of Connectedness Based on Everyday Mobility Across
Neighborhoods, 50 SOCIO. METHODS & RSCH. 1110 (2019) (evaluating neighborhoods’ degrees of structural connectedness in light of their residents’ contacts).
33 Wang et al., supra note 32, at 7736.
34 Id. at 7735–36.
35 Id.
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hoods visited in the metropolitan region. 36 This similarity seems
to contradict the logic of Professor William Wilson’s socialisolation thesis and the corresponding hypothesis of the constraining effects of concentrated poverty. 37 Despite relative parity
in the breadth of travel, however, there are notable differences
in the race and class compositions of the neighborhoods visited.38
Residents of poor neighborhoods are substantially isolated from
contacts with nonpoor neighborhoods when they travel. 39 Residents of primarily Black and Hispanic neighborhoods—whether
poor or not—are also far less exposed to nonpoor neighborhoods
than are residents of primarily White neighborhoods.40 This result means that race trumps economic status in shaping the mobility patterns of exposure to nonpoor White neighborhoods that
often command disparate resources, even though there are minimal (if any) differences in distance traveled and number of
neighborhoods visited by race. Put differently, racial inequality
may be even more pronounced than we realize once we account
for travel patterns.
Focusing on Chicago specifically, we reexamine Wang and
colleagues’ measure of racial and economic neighborhood isolation—the proportion of a neighborhood’s visits that are to
nonpoor, White neighborhoods. Figure 1 reveals stark disparities
by neighborhood racial composition. Over two-thirds of visits that
residents of nonpoor White neighborhoods in Chicago make are
to other nonpoor White neighborhoods. For poor White neighborhoods, over six out of every ten resident visits are to nonpoor
White neighborhoods. Among Black neighborhoods, by contrast,
only 8%–10% of visits are to nonpoor White neighborhoods—
regardless of poverty status. The share is somewhat higher
among Hispanic neighborhoods; again, however, there is little
variation by poverty status. These differences in the likelihoods of
Chicagoans visiting nonpoor White neighborhoods by neighborhood
racial status, regardless of economic status, outpace even the
sizable differences observed in the fifty largest U.S. cities. 41 In

36 Id. at 7735, 7739–40 (“Residents of poor minority neighborhoods . . . appear to
travel about as widely across their cities and to as many neighborhoods as those of other
groups.”).
37 See Wilson, supra note 29, at 58–61.
38 Wang et al., supra note 32, at 7739–40.
39 Id. at 7740.
40 Id.
41 See id. at 7739.
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other words, Chicago appears to be more segregated in mobility
by neighborhood race than other major U.S. cities.

III. CITY-LEVEL CONNECTEDNESS THROUGH EVERYDAY
MOBILITY
Our neighborhood-networks approach also sheds light on
the connectedness of cities, which in turn has theoretical consequences for their crime rates. Drawing on the same underlying
data used in the previous studies, Phillips, Brian Levy,
Sampson, Small, and Wang conceptualized a city’s connectedness (social integration) as the extent to which its neighborhoods
are tied to one another by the movement of their residents.42
They then developed two formal measures of these concepts. The
equitable-mobility index (EMI) reflects the extent to which residents of each neighborhood in a city travel equally to all other
neighborhoods in that city. 43 The concentrated-mobility index
(CMI) represents the extent to which residents’ travels outside
their residential neighborhoods are concentrated in a small
handful of destination neighborhoods. 44 For example, if every
resident in Chicago visited only Grant Park when leaving their
42
43
44

See Phillips et al., supra note 32, at 1111–12.
See id. at 1112.
See id.
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neighborhoods, then concentrated mobility would be at its peak
while equitable mobility would be at its nadir.
The measures actually reveal distinct pathways through
which a city’s neighborhoods can be well connected. All visits
could concentrate in a similar cluster of neighborhoods with
widely shared public spaces like parks, downtown areas, or other
such places (i.e., “hub” connectedness). Alternatively, when equitable mobility is high, each neighborhood’s residents are visiting
many others with great regularity. By comparison, the potential
for connectedness is limited when both equitable mobility and
concentrated mobility are low. Phillips and colleagues observe
this disconnected pattern in cities like Detroit, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and Cleveland, which have cleaved interneighborhood mobility networks. 45
We extended this approach to examine whether these two
measures of mobility-based (dis)connectedness are related to
violence beyond the expected effects of traditionally measured
segregation based on residence. 46 Theoretically, “social integration
depends on opportunities for contact, no matter how fleeting.”47
Opportunities for contact do not guarantee contact, but the absence of opportunities—as indicated by isolated mobility networks—“will undermine an essential precursor of macrosocial
integration, in this case of a city.” 48 In addition,
spatial divisions in everyday contact are likely to reduce
the identification or concern that residents in any given
neighborhood have for the other neighborhoods of a city,
which can translate into reluctance to support investment
in public goods such as housing, schools, transportation,
and substance-abuse treatment, eroding systems of social
control that prevent violence. 49
Again, studying the fifty largest U.S. cities, we found that cities
with low equitable mobility and low concentrated mobility—
cities with disconnected neighborhoods—tend to have higher
45 See id. at 1128, 1132 (illustrating that Detroit, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and
Cleveland have both low EMI and CMI values, and explaining that “low CMI and EMI
values indicate that the mobility network is cleaved, such that residents of the city neither
travel to the same neighborhoods en masse nor do they travel to many of the neighborhoods in the city overall”).
46 See Sampson & Levy, supra note 26, at 79–81.
47 Id. at 78; see also Phillips et al., supra note 32, at 1112, 1115.
48 Sampson & Levy, supra note 26, at 78.
49 Id.
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rates of homicide. 50 This pattern holds even after controlling for
traditional residential-segregation measures and other salient
characteristics. 51 In other words, mobility-based connections
seem to matter for predicting violence.
It turns out that Chicago has a low level of equitable mobility, but its concentrated mobility is essentially at the average of
the fifty cities. 52 Yet Chicago has a high rate of homicide and
violence. 53 In another analysis, Professor Jennifer Candipan and
colleagues went further to propose a dynamic measure of mobilitybased racial segregation—the segregated-mobility index—that
captures the degree to which neighborhoods of given racial compositions are connected to neighborhoods with different racial
compositions in equal measure. 54 They found that
segregated mobility captures a distinct element of racial
segregation, one that it is related to, but not solely a function
of, residential segregation. A city’s racial composition also
matters; minority group threat, especially in cities with
large Black populations and a troubled legacy of racial conflict, appears to depress movement across neighbourhoods
in ways that produce previously undocumented forms of racial segregation. 55
Among the fifty largest U.S. cities, Chicago has one of the highest rates of racially segregated mobility. 56 This finding suggests
that although there are locations of concentrated mobility in
Chicago, these mobility hubs remain highly racially segregated,
which may have implications for integration, shared concern,
and the mechanisms for violence highlighted above.

Id. at 81–83.
Id.
52 See Phillips et al., supra note 32, at 1128 fig.3.
53 See OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT, CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 39–
40 (2021); Sophie Sherry, Chicago Has Already Seen More Murders and Shootings This
Year Than All of 2019. Violence up in Most Neighborhoods Targeted by City, CHI. SUNTIMES (Sept. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/VE82-GK23.
54 Jennifer Candipan, Nolan Edward Phillips, Robert J. Sampson & Mario Small,
From Residence to Movement: The Nature of Racial Segregation in Everyday Urban
Mobility, 58 URB. STUD. 3095, 3097–99 (2021).
55 Id. at 3095; see also id. at 3113–14.
56 See id. at 3111–12.
50
51
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IV. NEIGHBORHOOD NETWORKS, TRIPLE DISADVANTAGE, AND
CRIME
Homing in on the neighborhood level, patterns of connectedness and isolation in a city also have potential implications for
the capacities of and resources available to specific neighborhoods. Although neighborhoods spatially surrounded by economically disadvantaged neighborhoods exhibit higher rates of violence, 57 residents often travel far and wide beyond their
residential and proximal neighborhoods in the metropolis. 58 How
might these broader and more comprehensive interneighborhood
connections impact crime? Levy, Phillips, and Sampson examined
how these socioeconomic patterns of urban-mobility flows carry
consequences for neighborhood violence. 59 For a given neighborhood, they estimated the extent to which its residents tend to
visit disadvantaged neighborhoods in the city (outdegree disadvantage) as well as the extent to which its visits come from residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods (indegree disadvantage).60
Combining these two mobility-based measures of a neighborhood’s disadvantage level with the traditional measure, which is a
static calculation of its residents’ socioeconomic characteristics,
Levy and colleagues theorized the concept of “triple neighborhood disadvantage.” 61 Of course, the absence of disadvantage is
itself a form of advantage; analogously, a neighborhood can also
be triply advantaged. Although the authors find fairly strong
correlations between the three metrics, they are not duplicative,
and there are many cases where the three scores diverge. 62
There are several theoretical reasons to focus on the added
value of triple disadvantage in explaining rates of neighborhood
See PETERSON & KRIVO, supra note 21, at 102–04.
See Wang et al., supra note 32, at 7739–40 (concluding that “[r]esidents of poor
minority neighborhoods . . . travel about as widely across their cities and to as many
neighborhoods as those of other groups”).
59 Levy et al., supra note 32, at 928–30.
60 “Outdegree” and “indegree” are network-science terms and reflect the underlying
calculation of the metrics as weighted averages of disadvantage scores based on the frequency of visits between neighborhoods. See id. at 926–27.
61 Id. at 926 (“Most neighborhood effects research considers a neighborhood to be
socioeconomically disadvantaged if it scores highly only on one measured trait . . .
commonly indexed by measures like residential poverty, unemployment, and public
assistance receipt.”).
62 See id. at 935 (finding that the “measures of neighborhood disadvantage are
highly correlated in neighborhoods across the 50 cities” but that, “[d]espite these
measures being highly correlated, the variables are not deterministic” and that, “[a]cross
cities, there is considerable heterogeneity in these correlations”).
57
58
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violence. Triple disadvantage increases the likelihood of interactions occurring with or among nonresidents or strangers of similarly deprived status from other neighborhoods, which arguably
increases the potential for conflictual interactions, hence increasing the kinds of interpersonal disputes that trigger violence. 63 The ability of a neighborhood to achieve regulatory control also extends beyond these kinds of disputes and even its
own institutions, including its ability to marshal crimeprevention resources from municipal and state governments. For
example, research identifies that segregation creates a spatial
divide that reduces public investment in and erodes the local
regulatory capacity of poor Black communities. 64 Mobility-based
segregation is likely to exacerbate this spatial divide. Levy,
Phillips, and Sampson also hypothesized that tripleneighborhood disadvantage plays an important role in a neighborhood’s ability to maintain social control, develop collective
efficacy, and access crime-reducing resources.65 More specifically,
“[t]he structural connection of a triply (dis)advantaged neighborhood to other similarly situated neighborhoods would amplify
its (lack of) resources for successful crime control.” 66
Analyzing nearly 32,000 neighborhoods and 9,700 homicides
in thirty-seven of the largest U.S. cities, Levy, Phillips, and
Sampson find that “triple disadvantage independently predicts
homicides, adjusting for traditional neighborhood correlates of
violence, spatial proximity to disadvantage, prior homicides, and
city fixed effects. Not only is triple disadvantage a stronger predictor than traditional measures, it accounts for a sizable portion
of the association between residential neighborhood disadvantage
and homicides.” 67 For example, mobility-based disadvantage can
account for roughly one-fifth of the relationship between residential disadvantage and homicide.68 Moreover, including the three
measures of triple disadvantage improves the explanatory power
of a model of neighborhood homicide counts by almost a third as
compared to a model including only residential disadvantage with
63 See id. at 930 (explaining how “interpersonal friction” between similarly violenceprone adolescents is highest in triply disadvantaged neighborhoods).
64 Michael T. Light & Julia T. Thomas, Segregation and Violence Reconsidered: Do
Whites Benefit from Residential Segregation?, 84 AM. SOCIO. REV. 690, 695 (2019);
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 18, at 106–08.
65 Levy et al., supra note 32, at 930–33.
66 Id. at 927.
67 Id. at 925; see also id. at 937–38, 949.
68 Id. at 949.
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controls. 69 For homicides, indegree disadvantage—or the influx
of visitors from other poor neighborhoods—is more salient than
outdegree disadvantage. 70 In terms of specific mechanisms, neighborhood drug activity, interpersonal friction, and gun prevalence
can explain sizable portions of the association between triple disadvantage and homicides. 71
V. TRIPLE DISADVANTAGE AND VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO
What do patterns of triple disadvantage look like in Chicago,
and does the added explanatory power that we observe across
large U.S. cities hold there? Briefly, there are large disparities
in triple disadvantage among Chicago neighborhoods, and triple
disadvantage improves our understanding of Chicago violence
and homicide. Figure 2 presents two maps of triple disadvantage
and homicide in Chicago.

For a base layer, both use the 2014 measure of triple disadvantage calculated by Levy and colleagues. 72 This ranges from
light shading (indicating a very low triple-disadvantage score for
a neighborhood—in essence an advantaged neighborhood given

69
70
71
72

Id.
Levy et al., supra note 32, at 949.
Id. at 944–47.
Id. at 936.
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the absence of triple disadvantage) to dark shading (indicating a
very high triple-disadvantage neighborhood).
Panel A presents the 2015–2016 neighborhood homicide
rate as red circles with size scaled to indicate a higher rate. This
period includes the near doubling of Chicago homicides in 2016,
just over a year after the murder of Laquan McDonald. Immediately apparent is the strong concentration of homicides in
neighborhoods with very high levels of triple disadvantage in
Chicago’s South and West Sides. Panel B presents the 2019–
2020 homicide rate, which again includes a period of surging
violence in 2020—this time a more than 50% increase in homicides during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. 73 This
map demonstrates the stable spatial concentration of homicides
over time and the predictive power of triple disadvantage for
homicide distribution a half-decade later.
One reason for triple disadvantage’s lasting predictive power for violence is the stability of triple disadvantage over time.
For all neighborhoods in the fifty largest U.S. cities, Figure 3
plots their triple-disadvantage scores from 2014 (based on Twitter
data), which are used here and in prior analyses, 74 against newly
calculated scores for their triple-disadvantage levels in 2019
using data on mobility from tens of millions of mobile phones.
Specifically, the figure plots the correlation in a neighborhood’s
2014 and 2019 measures of indegree neighborhood disadvantage
(Indegree ND) in Panel A, outdegree neighborhood disadvantage
(Outdegree ND) in Panel B, and the composite triple disadvantage measure in Panel C. As is immediately clear from the
Figure, all three variables have very strong stability over time
at the neighborhood level. 75 Remarkably, in Chicago, the correlation in a neighborhood’s triple disadvantage level between 2014
and 2019 is even higher than the level for all fifty large cities.
We observe this stability in Chicago and nationwide despite a
five-year gap in time—during which gentrification was ongoing
in Chicago 76 as in many large cities—and different methods of
OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT, CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 53, at 40, 44.
See generally, e.g., Wang et al., supra note 32.
75 Specifically, we calculate Pearson correlation coefficients for all three panels. For
the fifty largest U.S. cities, the correlations between a neighborhood’s 2014 and 2019
values of indegree, outdegree, and triple disadvantage measures are 0.91, 0.87, and 0.94,
respectively. In Chicago, these three correlations are 0.93, 0.88, and 0.96, respectively.
76 See Jackelyn Hwang & Robert J. Sampson, Divergent Pathways of Gentrification:
Racial Inequality and the Social Order of Renewal in Chicago Neighborhoods, 79 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 726, 745–46 (2014).
73
74
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data collection on everyday mobility (geocoded tweets versus
mobile-phone-location pings). In addition to revealing why triple
disadvantage can predict homicide several years later, this
strong correlation between measures using distinct data on urban mobility also improves our confidence in their validity.
FIGURE 3: INDEGREE, OUTDEGREE, AND TRIPLE DISADVANTAGE
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The maps of Chicago in Figure 2 indicate a relationship between triple disadvantage and homicide, but they do not adjust
for other factors that might explain the relationship—in other
words, other independent causes that could drive both triple
disadvantage and homicide levels. Levy and colleagues used regression analysis to demonstrate the added predictive power of
2014 triple disadvantage for 2015–2016 homicide rates in
neighborhoods of thirty-seven large cities. 77 In Figure 4, we pool
two years of homicide data to analyze whether the 2014 tripledisadvantage levels of Chicago neighborhoods can explain both
their rates of violent crime in 2020 and the incidence of homicides in 2019–2020. Again, this period reflects the rash of violence seen from the summer through the winter of 2020. Figure 4
presents the results of these analyses.

77

Levy et al., supra note 32, at 941–42.
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FIGURE 4: NEIGHBORHOOD DISADVANTAGE AND VIOLENT CRIME

Panel A plots a neighborhood’s predicted 2020 violent-crime
rate based on separate models using residential disadvantage
(the solid line) or triple disadvantage (the dashed line). Both
models control for other relevant variables. 78 The figure makes
78 Models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and robust
errors. Controls include neighborhood-level measures of log population size, log population
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clear that, in Chicago, neighborhood-level disparities in violentcrime rates are more pronounced by triple disadvantage than by
residential-neighborhood disadvantage alone. Adjusting for
controls, a neighborhood at the low end of residential disadvantage in Chicago is expected to have a violent crime rate of
roughly 8.33 violent crimes per 1,000 residents. A neighborhood
at the high end of residential disadvantage, by contrast, has a
predicted rate of about 15.78 violent crimes per 1,000 residents—a gap of 7.45 violent crimes in 2020. Looking at triple
disadvantage, however, neighborhoods at the low and high ends
have predicted violent crime rates of 7.02 and 17.04 crimes per
1,000 residents, or a gap of roughly 10 violent crimes. Thus, the
“low-high disadvantage gap” by triple disadvantage is 35% larger
than that by residential disadvantage.
Panel B plots a neighborhood’s predicted homicide count in
2019–2020 based on separate models 79 using residential disadvantage or triple disadvantage. Again, we see larger disparities
by triple disadvantage than by residential disadvantage. Given
the relatively rare nature of homicide, predicted homicide counts
per neighborhood are less than one across the values of neighborhood disadvantage. This pattern aligns with the data: fewer
than one-third of Chicago neighborhoods experienced a homicide
in 2019 or 2020. 80 Still, there are disparities by neighborhood
disadvantage. Chicago neighborhoods with the highest levels of
residential disadvantage tend to have three to four times the
number of homicides as Chicago neighborhoods with the lowest
levels of residential disadvantage. By contrast, neighborhoods at
the high end of triple disadvantage have five to six times the
number of homicides as neighborhoods at the low end of triple
disadvantage. Moreover, the low-high disadvantage gap in predicted homicides by triple disadvantage is 31% larger than that
by residential disadvantage. In sum, although homicide is rare,
we observe important disparities by neighborhood socioeconomic conditions, and these disparities tend to be larger by
triple disadvantage.

density, median resident age, share of residents that are males between ages fifteen and
thirty-four, share of homes occupied by owners, residential stability (share of long-term
householders), and measures of racial composition (shares Black and Hispanic).
79 These models are similar to the models of violence in terms of variables. The two
differences are that these homicide models use Poisson regression with robust errors and
treat log population as an offset variable.
80 OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT, CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 53, at 44.
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Our results are not without limitations. Perhaps most importantly, they are not based on a causal analysis, although we
include theoretically important covariates measured with precision. Levy and colleagues go further in their analysis of homicides across thirty-seven cities not only by adjusting for the
same controls but also by controlling for city-level fixed effects
and lagged homicide counts. 81 We found there—and find here—a
substantive and statistically significant relationship between
triple-neighborhood disadvantage and homicides. Here, we also
identify a direct relationship of triple disadvantage with overall
rates of violence after adjusting for other major correlates, which
is an outcome not analyzed by Levy and colleagues. Future research, perhaps using natural experiments that change the nature of interneighborhood mobility, might provide a stronger
causal design. Future research could also draw on novel data
sources that can potentially overcome limitations associated
with social-media data, such as cellphone records that capture
movement based on GPS data, which we have begun to use here.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this Essay, we advanced an approach to understanding
variation in violence and crime among neighborhoods and cities
based on the concept of everyday urban mobility. Consistent
with our major premise, mobility-based socioeconomic disadvantage predicts rates of violence in Chicago’s neighborhoods
beyond their residence-based disadvantage and other local
characteristics, including during recent years that witnessed
surges in violence and other broad social changes. It is perhaps
surprising how much explanatory power resides in compounded
disadvantage, or what we defined as “triple disadvantage,” in
explaining rates of homicide and violence across Chicago. By
highlighting the independent value of mobility-based disadvantage in explaining neighborhood disparities in violence, our
research provides fresh evidence and a new theoretical framework on the importance of extralocal conditions for understanding spatial inequality in Chicago.
Racial disparities in triple disadvantage are pronounced
and seemingly at odds with recent declines in racial segregation

81

Levy et al., supra note 32, at 927.
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and the increasing diversity of U.S. cities. 82 A previously unrecognized form of racially inscribed isolation is occurring whereby
residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods travel well beyond
their home residence, and yet their relative isolation or segregation by race and class persists within the wider metropolis. This
finding implies that social isolation by race and class in everyday life operates at a higher-order level than typically appreciated or systematically measured by urban scholars. In fact,
among the fifty largest U.S. cities,
mostly black and mostly Hispanic neighborhoods are 31 and
41 times as likely as mostly white neighborhoods to have
[residential disadvantage] scores at least one standard deviation above the national mean. Yet, mostly black and
Hispanic neighborhoods are 77 and 84 times as likely as
mostly white neighborhoods to have [triple disadvantage]
scores at least one standard deviation above the mean. 83
This pattern suggests that indicators focused solely on residentbased disadvantage obscure the magnitude of racial inequality
in neighborhood socioeconomic conditions. 84
In Chicago, racial inequality in triple disadvantage exists in
full force as well. Figure 5 presents the distribution of neighborhoods by majority racial status in a way that the magnitude of
differentials in triple disadvantage can be easily visualized. A
stark split between neighborhoods is apparent. Approximately
half of White neighborhoods are very low in triple disadvantage.
The polar opposite is true for Black neighborhoods, with approximately half being very high in triple disadvantage. Hispanic
neighborhoods are more disadvantaged than White neighborhoods, but Hispanic neighborhoods are more evenly distributed
across disadvantaged types than Black neighborhoods. Other
neighborhoods look more like White neighborhoods than like
Black or Hispanic neighborhoods.

82 See Glenn Firebaugh & Chad R. Farrell, Still Large, but Narrowing: The Sizable
Decline in Racial Neighborhood Inequality in Metropolitan America, 1980–2010, 53
DEMOGRAPHY 139, 151–54 (2016); Sabrina Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, Census Shows
Sharply Growing Numbers of Hispanic, Asian and Multiracial Americans, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/C2HK-RWLC.
83 Levy et al., supra note 32, at 951.
84 See supra text accompanying notes 78–79.
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FIGURE 5: RACE AND TRIPLE DISADVANTAGE

The inevitable conclusion is that, while the 2020 Census
demonstrates that the U.S. is becoming increasingly diverse,85
the types of interactions across race and class boundaries in the
spaces of our cities that ultimately contribute to societal integration are not taking place in the manner that we might think,
perhaps especially so in Chicago. Indeed, among all U.S. cities,
Chicago ranks among the very highest in terms of racially segregated mobility patterns, second only to Detroit. 86 This may
prove important because the combination of low overall equitable mobility and the lack of travel to common areas adds to the
prediction of homicide and overall violence across U.S. cities,
controlling for residential racial segregation, economic inequality,
and other traditional factors. 87 In this sense, social connectedness through everyday mobility is a multilayered force that yields
an enduring higher-order structure,88 one that is potentially more
consequential than most neighborhood-based theories of crime
acknowledge. Future research is needed to examine the extent
to which rates of crime and violence across cities are related to

85
86
87
88

Tavernise & Gebeloff, supra note 82.
Candipan et al., supra note 54, at 18.
Sampson & Levy, supra note 26, at 81–83.
SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 375.
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racially segregated mobility specifically, or segregated mobility
generally.
At the neighborhood level, triple-disadvantage theory
should be expanded in future research and tested with other data
sources. Further work using georeferenced cell phone tracking
presents many opportunities to test the added value of triple
disadvantage beyond residential disadvantage for explaining
neighborhood disparities in violence in all U.S. cities and potentially around the world, especially during recent years of increasing violence around the country. Because triple disadvantage
has been theorized to increase conflictual encounters, it may also
prove important in explaining volatile police-citizen encounters
and police killings. In addition, the success of community-based
movements for criminal justice reform is dependent upon resources and network ties beyond the local neighborhood. We
thus conclude that mobility-based advantages, or the lack thereof,
should be high on the agenda of future research examining the
drivers of both crime and criminal justice outcomes.
The theoretical underpinnings of our approach are general
in nature, however, and not limited to violence or criminal justice.
Triple disadvantage is plausibly associated with neighborhood
capacity and collective efficacy, for example, and these relationships should be explored as additional ways that structural interneighborhood ties can affect vitality. Nonprofit organizations
and community-governance institutions constitute important
resources for communities that may be particularly sensitive to
mobility-based disadvantages. 89 There are also reasons to believe that interneighborhood mobility presents opportunities
for pandemic transmission. 90 COVID-19 is transmitted primarily through airborne channels, and social distancing and stay-athome guidelines underscore the importance of reducing the human contact induced by mobility. 91 In addition to the direct

89 See, e.g., Nicole P. Marwell & Shannon L. Morrissey, Organizations and the
Governance of Urban Poverty, 46 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 233, 242–44 (2020); MARIO LUIS
SMALL, UNANTICIPATED GAINS: ORIGINS OF NETWORK INEQUALITY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 18–
20 (2009).
90 See Serina Chang, Emma Pierson, Pang Wei Koh, Jaline Gerardin, Beth
Redbird, David Grusky & Jure Leskovec, Mobility Network Models of COVID-19 Explain
Inequities and Inform Reopening, 589 NATURE 82, 84 (2021); Boyeong Hong, Bartosz J.
Bonczak, Arpit Gupta, Lorna E. Thorpe & Constantine E. Kontokosta, Exposure Density
and Neighborhood Disparities in COVID-19 Infection Risk, 118 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.
1, 2, 7 (2021).
91 See Hong et al., supra note 90, at 2.
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transmission pathway, neighborhood connections can also impact the allocation of municipal funds and institutional capacity
to facilitate collective efficacy in response to crisis, such as
pandemic spread. 92 More generally, we argue that triply disadvantaged neighborhoods may lack the necessary coalitions to
achieve significant overall public or private investment and may
further lack the social or spatial proximity to critical organizational resources that support human flourishing. The higherorder social structure of a city is thus critical for the broad wellbeing of its neighborhoods and residents.

92 Brian L. Levy, Karl Vachuska, S.V. Subramanian & Robert J. Sampson,
Neighborhood Socioeconomic Inequality Based on Everyday Mobility Predicts COVID-19
Infection in San Francisco, Seattle, and Wisconsin, SCI. ADVANCES (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 8) (on file with author).

